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Abstract

With the emergence of a long-distance land-based trade, along with the expansion of a non-sea
based multimodal trade, a demand arose for a negotiable transport document which is not limited
to marine transport. A series of international conventions responded to such demand by providing
for new types of negotiable transport documents. However, these conventions failed to accord to
such documents the features of a document of title and to clarify their negotiable character. The
task of overcoming this obstacle is hindered by the fragmentary nature of the law governing the
marine bill of lading, which is the classic transport document serving as a document of title.
Endeavouring to clarify and rationalise that law and using English law as a basis for the
investigation, this article critically discusses the negotiability and legal nature of transferable
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transport documents with a view to providing a cohesive, harmonised legal framework to govern
them and form the basis for a subsequent adaptation to apply to electronic transport records.
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I.

Introduction

In recent years, a long-distance land-based trade, particularly by rail in Eurasia,1 along with a nonsea based multimodal trade, emerged and expanded. With it, new forms of paper and electronic
transport records surfaced, designed to facilitate transactions and modes of financing using the
transport documents as tokens for the goods. Having given rise to issues in relation to both
digitisation and the nature of transport records including their negotiability, these developments
have caught the attention of UNCITRAL.2 In turn, the subject of digitisation has not escaped the

1

See e.g., C. Putz, “From London to Yiwu in 17 Days: OBOR’s British Connection” (12 April 2017), The

Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/from-london-to-yiwu-in-17-days-obors-british-connection/ [Accessed
March 17, 2022]. The project may not be devoid of political implications: see: “‘Iron silk road’ threatens to
sidetrack Russia” (31 October 2017), Nikkei Asia, https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Iron-silk-road-threatens-tosidetrack-Russia [Accessed March 17, 2022]. Needless to say, recent geopolitical events only complicated matters
for the project even more than for international trade in general.
2

See e.g., UNCITRAL, Possible future work regarding railway consignment notes: Proposal by the Government of

the People’s Republic of China, 52nd Sess, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/998, June 2019; UNCITRAL, Possible future work
on railway consignment notes, 53rd Sess, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/1034, May 2020; UNCITRAL, Report of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Fifty-second session (8-19 July 2019), UNCITRAL Official
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attention of law reformers3 and scholars.4 At the same time, the nature of the newly emerging
transport documents—including their negotiability—has remained under the radar in the literature.

This article addresses the nature of tangible transport documents and their negotiability. It
purports to shed a new light on English law governing the marine bill of lading (BOL) in a broader
context of transport documents in general. Having thus presented a new framework, the article
endeavours to use it as a basis for facilitating the provision of solid contents to core concepts
introduced and or/used by new international conventions governing transport documents not
limited to the marine trade. The goal is to accommodate international legal projects with which a
reformed English law will be harmonious. In the process, the article exposes both the fragmented
nature and the inadequacy of the present understanding of the law to meet contemporary challenges
resulting in incapability of forming a solid basis for new types of documents—and by extension,
for functional equivalence by the emerging digital records. The proposed solution, being flexible
and relying on parties’ autonomy, is a roadmap for further work in the area.

Record, 74th Sess, Supp No 17, U.N. Doc. A/74/17 (2019) at para.217; and UNCITRAL, Report of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade, Fifty-third session (6-17 July 2020 and 14-18, September 2020),
UNCITRAL Official Record, 75th Sess, Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/75/17 (2020) at para.82.
3

See e.g., UK Law Commission’s consultation project seeking “Proposals to allow electronic documents would

revolutionise trade” (30 April 2021), Law Commission, https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/proposals-to-allow-electronicdocuments-would-revolutionise-trade/ [Accessed March 17, 2022].
4

See e.g., M. Goldby, “Digitalisation of Shipping and Insurance Documents: Implications for Trade Finance” in

Trade Finance: Technology, Innovation and Documentary Credits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), p.197;
J.K. Winn, “Will Blockchain Transform Trade Finance?” in Trade Finance: Technology, Innovation and
Documentary Credits (Oxford: OUP, 2021), p.230; F. Prevost, “Regulation in a digital world” in 2020 ICC Global
Survey on Trade Finance (Paris: ICC Banking Commission, 2020), p.77; Wang Feng, “Blockchain Bills of Lading
and Their Future Regulation” (National University of Singapore Centre for Maritime Law, 2021), National
University of Singapore, https://law.nus.edu.sg/cml/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2021/04/CML-WPS-2101.pdf,
pp.22–26 [Accessed March 17, 2022]. Earlier articles are by: Diana Faber, “Electronic Bills of Lading” (1996)
L.M.C.L.Q. 232; Malcolm Clarke, “Transport Documents: Their Transferability as Documents of Title; Electronic
Documents” (2002) L.M.C.L.Q. 356.
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With respect to bills of exchange, promissory notes and cheques, negotiability means,
firstly, the transferability of the instrument together with the right to sue parties liable on it for the
sum in which the instrument is denominated. Such transferability is by delivery (plus indorsement
when it is payable to order). This feature is referred to as formal or procedural negotiability.
Second, negotiability means the power to confer on a qualified transferee who took the instrument
in that manner—generally speaking, a bona fide purchaser for value (BFPV)—a better title than
that held by the transferor. This is referred to as substantive negotiability.5 There is no similar
uniform approach when it comes to the legal nature, negotiability, or even transferability of
documents of title to goods, not to mention other transport documents; namely, receipts issued to
consignors/shippers by carriers of goods who undertake to deliver the goods to consignees. At the
same time, the use of all such documents in international trade calls for legal harmonisation if not
uniformity with broad application to diverse transport documents. This goal becomes elusive
considering the deficit in clear principles within and among legal systems, all of which may hinder
trade finance.

The article proceeds as follows. In a broader context of classification of transport
documents, Part II identifies and discusses a category of transferable transport documents of
control to which negotiability may relate. It also addresses options as to the relationship between
the holder’s claim against the carrier on such a document and the holder’s right in the goods held
by the carrier. It then points out that to be mostly useful in trade finance a transport document of
control ought to be a document capable of according its holder, in relation to the goods,
constructive possession, right to claim delivery, as well as property. Part III introduces the marine
BOL as the classic document of title and explains the difference between negotiable and nonnegotiable BOLs. It further addresses the function of negotiability of BOLs used in trade finance.
Part IV provides a nuanced discussion on substantive negotiability and is innovative in arguing for
a limited substantive negotiability accorded in the common law to the negotiable BOL. Both Parts
III and IV point to some pertinent differences among the laws of a few major jurisdictions. Part V
addresses the negotiability under international conventions of transferable transport documents of

5

See e.g., B. Geva & S. Peari, International Negotiable Instruments (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020) pp.6–

8.
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control, particularly multimodal ones, other than marine BOLs. It highlights the lack of substantive
law that governs such documents, a situation that reduces their reliability as collateral in trade
finance. Parts III and particularly V highlight that the use of negotiable transport documents in
trade finance is in decline in the West but is on the rise in Asia, especially in Chinese-based
domestic and foreign trade. In conclusion, Part VI calls for reforming and harmonising the laws
applicable to transport documents in the context of establishing a universal modal-neutral BOL or
its equivalent. A key point in the argument is the need to apply the law applicable to BOLs to all
transferable transport documents of control but not before harmonising, rationalising and
reforming the law governing BOLs itself, both in the international and domestic spheres. The
successful accomplishment of this task is bound to form a firm basis for functional equivalence
rules that will govern electronic transferable transport documents of control.

II.

Transferable Transport Documents of Control (TTDCs) and the Right to the
Goods

A transport document is a receipt issued by the carrier of goods to the consignor/shipper upon
taking possession of them under a contract for their carriage to the consignee. It constitutes a
receipt for identified goods (or a specified portion thereof) by the party undertaking responsibility
for their carriage. It may also serve as a piece of evidence as to the terms of the contract for carriage
as well as to the apparent condition of the goods when received by the carrier.6 A transport
document of which production to the carrier is required in order to receive the possession of the
goods is referred to in this article as a transport document of control (TDC).

A transport document of which production to the carrier is neither required nor entitling to
receive the possession of the goods from the carrier is not a TDC. Such a document issued by the
carrier to the consignor typically remains in the consignor’s hands. It is not transferable even to
the named consignee and cannot be used as a token for transacting with the goods. Goods to which
it relates are to be released only to the named consignee without being required to surrender the

6

For a fuller summary see e.g., E. McKendrick, Goode and McKendrick on Commercial Law, 6th edn (London:

LexisNexis, 2020), pp.990–995, 1013–1021.
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transport document that in any event is not in the consignee’s hands. While lacking transferability,
the use of such a document may save time at both ends of the transaction. Thus, such a document
may be issued by the forwarder7 as soon as it receives the goods, prior to shipment, and used
immediately by the shipper to procure an advance from its bank against the goods, until their
delivery to the consignee.8 At the other end of the transaction, the consignee may collect the goods
upon their arrival and need not wait for the arrival of the document, which may be delayed. During
the voyage of the goods the consignor remains in full control. However, by contract the shipper
and carrier may render such documents as TDCs, at least insofar that they may be transferred to
the consignee and are to be surrendered to the carrier against the release of the goods.

By reference to carrying out a documentary sale, TDCs may be initially understood to mean
documents controlling the disposition of goods. Thus, under article 58 of the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Vienna, 1980) 9 (CISG), unless
otherwise agreed, the buyer of goods is required to pay their price “when the seller places either
the goods or documents controlling their disposition at the buyer’s disposal.” The phrase
‘documents controlling the disposition of goods’ was interpreted “as referring to any document …
that entitles the buyer to take possession of the goods or, once in the hands of the buyer, establishes
that the seller no longer has the right to control disposition of the goods.”10 Along with documents

7

A freight forwarder is one whose business is to help customers to arrange for the shipment of their goods. See

https://www.cdlogistics.ca/freight-news/differences-between-freight-forwarders-and-shipping-agents/ [Accessed
March 17, 2022].
8

Not being a TDC, it is used in international trade as a means of evidence to proof the shipment of the goods and to

establish and meet documentary requirements in payments under letters of credit, but not as collateral. On this point
see generally Part III and the concluding paragraphs of Part V.
9

United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Vienna, 1980) 1489 U.N.T.S. 3

(entered into force 1 January 1988).
10

See CISG Advisory Council, “CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 11: Issues Raised by Documents under the

CISG Focusing on the Buyer’s Payment Duty” (August 3, 2012), CISG-AC,
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that may be transferred from one person to another, such as negotiable bills of lading, the list
contains documents that are TDCs in a limited way. First, it includes documents that may be
transferred by the consignor only to the consignee—such as the non-negotiable (‘straight’) BOL—
where the consignee is required to present the document to the carrier against the delivery of the
goods but may not transfer the document onward. Second, the list includes documents that in the
usual course of events are not to be presented by the original consignee to receive delivery from
the carrier. However, during their voyage to the consignee, goods covered by such documents are
under the control of the consignor who may replace the consignee by transferring the document to
a new consignee and instructing the carrier to deliver the goods to that replacing consignee (instead
of to the original one) against the production of the transferred document. The air waybill11 as well
as road and rail consignment notes fall into this category. They become TDCs only once they are
transferred by the consignor to the replacing consignee.

The list also includes warehouse receipts and warrants, which are storage rather than
transport documents. In another way the definition is too narrow, as it addresses the documents
only in the context of the performance of a contract for the sale of goods.12 Accordingly, a more
precise definition could be ‘any transport document that gives the holder rights in relation to the

https://www.cisgac.com/file/repository/CISG_Advisory_Council_Opinion_No_11.pdf [Accessed March 17, 2022].
Also available online at: http://www.cisgac.com/cisgac-opinion-no11/ [Accessed March 17, 2022].
11

For the air waybill see CISG Advisory Council, fn.10 at para.6.6. Such practice is at least unusual for the sea

waybill: see fn.10 at paras 8.1–8.3.
12

In any event, documents that do not control the disposition of the goods were said to include the following, unless

there is a practice established between the parties or usage that governs the parties’ contract under CISG art.9,
requiring presentation of such a document: sea waybills; dock receipts, quai receipts or mate’s receipts; commercial
invoices; insurance policies or certificates; as well as survey reports, certificates of origin, certificates of quality, and
sanitary or phytosanitary certificates (the latter being inspection certificates issued by a competent governmental
authority to show that a particular shipment has been treated to be free from harmful pests and plant diseases).
Together with documents controlling the disposition of goods such goods are nevertheless “documents relating to
the goods” which under CISG art.34 the seller may be required to hand over to the buyer “at the time and place and
in the form required by the contract”.
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goods and requires the carrier to release the goods to the holder against the surrender of the
document.’13

Issued to the consignor/shipper, a TDC must thus be transferable, either exclusively to the
consignee, or also onward, either to one transferee, or from one holder to another in unrestricted
succession. Either way, in the terminology used in this article, it is a transferable TDC (TTDC)
which gives the holder control of or at least a claim to the goods held by the carrier. Depending on
its nature, a TTDC can transfer merely the carrier’s personal obligation to deliver the goods to the
holder. Alternatively or in addition, it may transfer constructive possession of the shipped goods,
property in them, or both.

It goes without saying that even where a consignor transfers a TTDC capable of transferring
property with the intent to pass property to the holder, the property which may be passed is that
which the consignor is capable to covey under general property law. Thus, under English law, to
pass property to the holder, the consignor must have title, even voidable,

14

to the goods.

Alternatively, the consignor must have the authority, even apparent, typically under the law of
agency,15 or, as discussed in the ensuing paragraphs, under specific statutory powers, to convey
them.

For his or her part, in the context of the use of TTDCs in the performance of a contract for
sale, the holder of a TTDC is exposed to certain risks so that his or her right to the goods in transit

13

Generally speaking, the holder is the person to whom the goods are to be delivered who is in possession of the

document. For a more precise definition, see fn.92 and surrounding text.
14

See Sale of Goods Act 1979 (c.54) (SGA) s.23:
“When the seller of goods has a voidable title to them, but his title has not been avoided at the time of the
sale, the buyer acquires a good title to the goods, provided he buys them in good faith and without notice of
the seller’s defect of title.”

15

As, for example, under the Factors Act 1889 (c.45) s.2(1).
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(namely, the goods in the carrier’s hands) may be defeated by an adverse claimant.16 In
English law, according to the type of the TTDC, risk primarily depends on who, between the
consignor-seller and TTDC holder, is in constructive possession of the goods held by the carrier.
Thus, as long as the consignor remains in constructive possession of the goods in transit, and
regardless whether property in the goods passed to the TTDC holder, the holder is exposed to the
risk that a subsequent buyer from the consignor will defeat the holder under the ‘seller in
possession’ provision of the SGA.17 The same statutory provision will protect a TTDC holder who
bought the goods from the consignor in constructive possession after the former had sold the goods
to another person.

The other side of the coin is where holding the TTDC confers on the holder constructive
possession of the goods in transit. In that case, under English law, the TTDC holder is protected
from an adverse claim arising from a subsequent transaction by the consignor.18 This is true at
least where also property in the goods passed to the holder,19 in which case the new buyer from

16

For its part, the carrier might be well advised in such a case to interplead and let the holder and the adverse

claimant fight it out. Arguably, on the basis of Hollins v Fowler (1875) [1874-80] All E.R. Rep. 118 (H.L.) upon
surrendering the goods to the party that ends up losing, the carrier will not escape strict liability to the winner in
conversion, even where the carrier acted in good faith, and even if the carrier surrendered the goods to the one who
has acquired the right to immediate possession, that is, adverse possession (and who nevertheless lost).
17

See SGA s.24:
“Where a person having sold goods continues or is in possession of the goods, or of the documents of title
to the goods, the delivery or transfer by that person, … of the goods or documents of title under any sale,
pledge, or other disposition thereof, to any person receiving the same in good faith and without notice of
the previous sale, has the same effect as if the person making the delivery or transfer were expressly
authorised by the owner of the goods to make the same.”

Under SGA s.61(1), “delivery” is defined to mean “voluntary transfer of possession from one person to another.”
18

In fact, also an earlier transaction, as long as it did not involve the transfer of the constructive possession of the

goods from the consignor to the (earlier) adverse claimant.
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the consignor will not be able to benefit from the ‘seller in possession’ provision of the SGA.20 At
the same time, a TTDC holder in constructive possession of the goods but not ownership may use
the ‘buyer in possession’ provision of the SGA21 to confer ownership of the goods on a qualified
purchaser who will prevail over the consignor.22

III.

TTDC Transfer and Negotiation: Negotiable and Non-negotiable Bills of Lading

As a matter of general principles, negotiability addresses two aspects. In its first and narrow sense,
it addresses the form of transfer. From this perspective, negotiability means the transferability of
a document that meets certain requirements, from one person to another (that is, from one holder
to another), by delivery, and depending on the form of the document, with or without the signature
of the transferor, called ‘indorsement.’ Such transfer, called ‘negotiation,’ accords the transferee—
the new holder—legal title to the right embodied in the document. This aspect is called procedural
or formal negotiability. Its effect is to ‘lock’ the right accorded by the document in a document

19

I suppose that where in conflict, the consignor’s proprietary right in the goods will trump the holder’s possessory

right to them.
20

SGA s.24.

21

See SGA s.25(1):
“Where a person … agreed to buy goods obtains, with the consent of the seller, possession of the goods or
the documents of title to the goods, the delivery or transfer by that person, … of the goods or documents of
title, under any sale, pledge, or other disposition thereof, to any person receiving the same in good faith and
without notice of any lien or other right of the original seller in respect of the goods, has the same effect as
if the person making the delivery or transfer were a mercantile agent in possession of the goods or
documents of title with the consent of the owner.”

22

Between a buyer from the consignor-owner and a buyer from the consignee-possessor the latter will prevail, at

least if he or she is first in time.
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itself 23 so that transacting with the document is tantamount to transacting with the right.24 In its
second and broader sense, negotiability addresses the potential impact of the transfer by
negotiation to confer on a qualified transferee (generally, a BFPV), a better title to the document
and the right embodied in it than that of the transferor. This quality of negotiability is called
substantive or material negotiability.25

In principle, negotiability of a TTDC may be either formal or substantive. It can thus mean
either mere transferability by negotiation, or transferability by negotiation that may confer a
superior title to the right embodied in the document to the transferee. In our context, depending on
the TTDC type, it is the personal right to receive the goods, have adverse possession therein, and/or
to the property in them.

In English law, negotiability does not play any role in either the protection or exposure of
a TTDC holder to a conflicting transaction in the goods in transit. Rather, as discussed at the end
of Part II, the holder’s protection or exposure depends on who, according to the TTDC type, has
constructive possession of the goods. However, substantive negotiability insulates the holder from
the carrier’s defences against the consignor as well as protects the holder against third-party claims
to the document (and the rights embodied therein). Where the document confers on the holder

23

In this sense, the negotiable instrument (and by extension, the negotiable transport document) is “a documentary

intangible” serving as “the physical embodiment of the … obligation” (McKendrick, Goode and McKendrick on
Commercial Law, 6th edn, p.579) in which “[t]he … claim is ‘merged’ into the paper evidencing the claim” (Grant
Gilmore, “The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase” (1954) 63 Yale L.J. 1057, 1064).
24

Whether the negotiable instrument falls under what in German jurisprudence is called a Wertpapier—defined in

art.965 of the Swiss Code of Obligations as “any document in which a right is incorporated in such a way that it
cannot be claimed nor transferred to others … without the document” (Swiss Code of Obligations: English
Translation of the Official Text, 4th edn (Zurich: Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce, 2003))—is addressed by
B. Geva, The Payment Order of Antiquity and the Middle Ages: A Legal History (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart
Publishing, 2011), p.583, fnn.422–423.
25

See text around fn.5.
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constructive possession and the power to transfer property in the goods, substantive negotiability
protects the holder from adverse claims to the goods asserted by claimants who would have
prevailed as to the document (and hence the goods) had it not been negotiable. More generally, the
qualified holder of a negotiable TTDC defeats adverse claims that can be raised only through
owning the right to the document. As indicated, depending on the type of the TTDC, such claims
may be to the mere delivery, possession, and/or property of the goods. Prevailing as to the
document, the qualified holder defeats the pertinent adverse claims.26

A TTDC of which a transfer may convey constructive possession and facilitate the passage
(or creation) of a property right in the goods represented by it is a document of title.27 Under the
common law, the classic document of title to goods, in fact the only one,28 is the BOL issued 29 by

26

It is thus incorrect to say, as stated by Raphael Brunner, Electronic Transport Documents and Shipping Practice

Not Yet a Married Couple (Zurich: University of Zurich, 25 April 2007), p.40, that “[o]nly a document of title may
be negotiable.” I understand this to mean that negotiability is limited only a to TTDC conveying constructive
possession and facilitating the passage of property (which, as discussed immediately below, is a document of title).
27

See e.g., Ontario Personal Property Security Act 1990 (Canada) s.1(1) which defines “document of title” to mean:
“[A]ny writing that purports to be issued by or addressed to a bailee and purports to cover such goods in the
bailee’s possession as are identified or fungible portions of an identified mass, and that in the ordinary
course of business is treated as establishing that the person in possession of it is entitled to receive, hold
and dispose of the document and the goods it covers”.

For a comprehensive analysis of the document of title see e.g., M. Bridge & K. Low, The Law of Personal Property
3rd edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2021) at paras 5.028–5.047.
28

McKendrick, Goode and McKendrick on Commercial Law, 6th edn, p.992.

29

It is frequently issued in several (usually three) originals, a situation reflecting the period in which they were

dispatched by mail and in which mailing was insecure. For some elaboration, see e.g., L. Railas, The Rise of the Lex
Electronica and the International Sale of Goods: Facilitating Electronic Transactions Involving Documentary
Credit Operations (Helsinki: University of Helsinki, 2004), pp.240, 242, which is accessible online at
https://helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/handle/10138/224327/THERISEO.pdf?sequence=1 [Accessed March 17, 2022].

12

a sea carrier.30 When it is addressed to the order of a named person or to bearer, and sometimes
only where it is marked ‘negotiable’, the BOL is negotiable. Otherwise, and sometimes when it is
marked so, it is non-negotiable. A negotiable BOL made out to order is transferrable by delivery
and indorsement, whether special or in blank. A negotiable BOL made out to bearer is transferable
by delivery alone. There is no unanimity as to whether a BOL made out to order without saying to
order of whom is to be considered as made out to the shipper’s order (so as to require the shipper’s
indorsement for a transfer) or to bearer (so as to be transferable by delivery alone). The holder of
a negotiable document is either the one to whose order the document is made or indorsed, who is
in its possession, or its bearer. The indorsement in blank of a document made out to order renders
it a bearer document, except that the holder may convert a blank indorsement to a special one,
thereby restoring the document to an order one.

At the same time, under the common law, the non-negotiable (‘straight’) BOL is
transferable only from the consignor to the consignee. As discussed below, in some other
jurisdictions the non-negotiable (‘straight’) BOL may also be transferred in succession, albeit not
by negotiation.

The bill of exchange, cheque, and promissory note are model negotiable instruments. Each
is mandated by statute to consist of a terse unconditional order or promise31 so as to be “a courier
without luggage.”32 The issuance of each such an instrument is tantamount, at least in form,33 “to

30

For a short history of the bill of lading, as of its medieval origins, see Chapter 1 of R. Aikens et al., Bills of

Lading, 3rd edn (London: Routledge, 2020). For an earlier account which also addresses warehouse receipts, see
e.g., William Britton, “Negotiable Documents of Title” (1954) 5 Hasting L.J. 103, 104–105.
31

See e.g., Bills of Exchange Act 1882 (c.61) (BEA) ss.3(1), 83(1), respectively.

32

Overton v Tyler (1846) 3 Pa. 346 at 347.

33

In fact, regarding position vis-à-vis a holder not in due course, the position is much more nuanced. See especially

Benjamin Geva, “Equities as to Liability on Bills and Notes: Rights of a Holder Not in Due Course" (1980) 5
Canadian Business L.J. 53.
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an independent contract within the wider contract in pursuance of which it was executed and not
dependent as regards its enforcement on due performance of the latter.”34 Conversely, neither
mercantile usage nor custom or statute mandate a strict terse form for the BOL.35 Unlike the bill
of exchange and the promissory note, the BOL is inherently linked to the contract of carriage and
evidences rather than suspends36 its terms. Nevertheless, while the carrier’s undertaking thereunder
has no shade of autonomy,37 even between the carrier and consignor,38 the BOL usually reflects
the entire agreement.39 Nor is an indorser thereon liable to the BOL holder40 who, in turn, does not
benefit from any presumption as to taking for value and in good faith.41 These features does not
preclude the BOL from being ‘negotiable’ in one way or another.

34

James Lamont & Co Ltd v Hyland Ltd [1950] 1 K.B. 585 (C.A.) at 591.

35

Though R. Aikens et al., Bills of Lading may have gone too far in stating at p.19 that “[l]ike an elephant, a bill of

lading is generally easier to recognise than to define.”
36

Which is the presumption for the bill of exchange, cheque and promissory note: Re Charge Card Services Ltd

[1988] 3 All E.R. 702 CA (Civ Div) at 707, per Sir Nicolas Brown-Wilkinson V.C.
37

For the link between the bill of lading and the consideration, that is, the underlying transaction, see e.g., Luis

Cova Arria, “Legal Obstacles to the Implementation of the Electronic Bill of Lading in Civil Law Countries” (1997)
European Transport Law 709, 709. See also Martine Remond-Gouilloud, Droit Maritime, 2nd edn (Paris: Pedone,
1993), p.356. For a more hesitant position to the same effect, see René Rodière, Traité Général de Droit Maritime,
Affrètements & Transports (Paris: Dalloz, 1968), tome II, p.109.
38

More so between the carrier and a remote holder-BFPV. See text at fn.106.

39

Leduc v Ward (1888) 20 Q.B., (1888) 20 Q.B.D. 475, 479–480, per Lord Esher M.R. See generally G. Treitel &

F.M.B. Reynolds, Carver on Bills of Lading, 4th edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2017), pp.97–102.
40

For the indorser’s liability, see BEA s.55(2).

41

For such presumptions, see BEA.
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In the common law, Lickbarrow v Mason (1787)42 stands for the nature of the BOL as a
document of title that in its negotiable form may pass both constructive possession of and property
in the goods in transit. According to Ashhurst J.,43 “as between the vendor [i.e., the shipper] and
third persons [e.g., a holder], the delivery of a BOL is a delivery of the goods themselves.”
Similarly, in Barber v Meyerstein (1866),44 addressing the situation “in which goods which are at
sea being transmitted from one country to another [so that] you cannot deliver actual possession
of them,” the BOL was “considered to be a symbol of the goods, [so that] its delivery [was deemed]
to be a delivery of the goods.” Stated otherwise, the BOL is “a key which in the hands of a rightful
owner is intended to unlock the door of the warehouse, floating or fixed, in which the goods may
chance to be.”45

As well in Lickbarrow v Mason (1787), Grose J. thought that as a matter of law “as between
the vendor and the assignee of the vendee, the bill of lading transfers the property” in the goods.46
Buller J. appears to be of the same opinion.47 In a subsequent proceeding in the case, 48 he was
reported to speak of “the universal doctrine of Westminster-Hall” under which “by a bill of lading,
and by the assignment of it, the legal property does pass.”49

42

Lickbarrow v Mason (1787) 2 T.R. 63; 100 E.R. 35.

43

Lickbarrow v Mason (1787) 2 T.R. 63 at 71; 100 E.R. 35 at 39, per Ashhurst J.

44

[1861-73] All E.R. Rep. Ext. 1810 (H.L.) at 1825.

45

Sanders Bros v Maclean & Co (1883) 11 Q.B.D. 327 at 341, per Bowen L.J.

46

Lickbarrow v Mason (1787) 2 T.R. 63 at 76; 100 E.R. 35 at 42.

47

Lickbarrow v Mason (1787) 2 T.R. 63 at 73, 75; 100 E.R. 35 at 40–41.

48

Lickbarrow v Mason (in Error) Dom Proc. 1793, reproduced in Newsom v Thornton (1805) 6 East 17 at 22; 102

E.R. 1189 at 1192.
49

Newsom v Thornton (1805) 6 East 17 at 26; 102 E.R. 1189 at 1192.
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Subsequently in Sewell v Burdick (1884),50 recognizing that “where the goods are at sea,
and there is a transfer of the bill of lading, there is a delivery of possession,” 51 the House of Lords
held that whether the effect of the delivery of a BOL is to transfer property to the holder depends
on the intention of the parties.52 More recently, in The Future Express (1992),53 Judge Diamond
QC went further, considering it “a fundamental feature of English law that the transfer of a bill of
lading does not pass constructive possession of goods to the transferee unless it is the intention of
the parties to the transfer that this should occur.”54 However, this statement is considered limited
to the unusual facts of that case.55 Otherwise, the consensus is that “[t]he bill of lading constitutes
an acknowledgement by the carrier that the goods will be held by whoever is the current holder of
the bill of lading.”56 This is along the lines of the universal understanding that under normal

50

[1881–5] All E.R. Rep. 223 (H.L.).

51

Sewell v Burdick (1884) [1881–5] All E.R. Rep. (H.L.) 223 at 236.

52

This is also true for the passage of title from the consignor/seller to the consignee/buyer, which is a matter to be

determined according to rules under sale of goods legislation rather than the transfer of the BOL. See McKendrick,
Goode and McKendrick on Commercial Law, 6th edn, p.992. In fact, the view that it is the intent of the parties
which determines the transfer of the "property" in the goods goes back to Buller J.’s own judgement in Hibbert v
Carter (1787) 1 T.R. 745; 99 E.R. 1355 (K.B.).
53

[1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 79 (Q.B.) at 95–96, reversed on other grounds in [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 542 (C.A.).

54

See McKendrick, Goode and McKendrick on Commercial Law, 6th edn, p.60, fn.138.

55

In the facts of the case, having sold and delivered the goods to another, the seller negotiated the BOL to the holder

and thus could not be taken as intending to transfer the possession of the goods.
56

See e.g., McKendrick, Goode and McKendrick on Commercia Law, 6th edn, p.992. See also Treitel & Reynolds,

Carver on Bills of Lading, 4th edn, p.317.

16

circumstances the transfer of the possession to the goods is the typical or presumed intention of
parties to the transfer of a BOL.57

Accordingly, the BOL is “a negotiable receipt for the cargo.” Under its contract “the
shipowners are obliged to deliver cargo only against presentation [by the holder] of a bill of
lading.”58 However, at common law, this obligation is enforceable only by the consignor. Thus, it
was held in Thompson v Dominy (1845)59 that “there is nothing to shew that a bill of lading is
transferable under any custom of merchants. It transfers no more than the property in the goods; it
does not transfer the contract.” The argument that a BOL “possesses all the properties of a bill of
exchange” so as to give the transferee/holder the right to sue in his or her name on the BOL was
said to “lead to absurdity.”60 Accordingly, the transferee/holder may not sue the carrier on the
BOL; rather, where the carrier declines to surrender the goods to the transferee/holder upon
presentment, the latter may bring against the former an action in conversion.61

Accordingly, under the common law, while being accorded the right to possess the goods,
the holder of a BOL may sue on the BOL neither the shipper nor the carrier. This astonishing result
appears to me inconsistent with the impact of negotiability to merge a claim to a written obligation
on negotiable paper into a claim to the piece of paper that embodies it, so that the transfer of the

57

Railas, The Rise of the Lex Electronica and the International Sale of Goods: Facilitating Electronic Transactions

Involving Documentary Credit Operations (2004), p.242. For the bill of lading as a “legal surrogate for the physical
delivery of the goods,” see Brunner, Electronic Transport Documents and Shipping Practice Not Yet a Married
Couple, p.38, citing John Hare, Shipping Law & Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, 1st edn (Cape Town: Juta,
1999), §14–3.3.
58

Kuwait Petroleum Corp v I&D Oil Carriers Ltd (The Houda) [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 541 at 556, per Millett L.J.

59

14 M. & W. 403 at 407; 153 E.R. 532 at 534, per Parke B.

60

Thompson v Dominy (1845) 14 M. & W. 403 at 408; 153 E.R. 534 at 534, per Alderson B.

61

For a comprehensive discussion of more recent case law, see Paul Todd, “The Bill of Lading and Delivery: The

Common Law Actions” (2006) Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 539, 540–552.
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paper, being a chattel, transfers with it the right to enforce the obligation.62 Indeed, even accepting
that the BOL does not “possess … all the properties of a bill of exchange,”63 the conclusion in
Thompson v Dominy (1845)64 that under the “custom of merchants" a BOL “transfers no more than
the property in the goods [but] not … the contract”65 is, to say the least, problematic. This is so if
only to the extent that this conclusion means that the transfer of the BOL does not pass the right to
enforce the obligation on it. Of course, no “custom of merchants” to that end had been proven in
this and earlier cases. Alternatively, if reference to “custom of merchants” was to the ‘law
merchant’66 which is more likely the case, it has to be recalled that under the modern view the ‘law
merchant’ effectively consists of rules and principles adapting the common law to apply to
instruments and documents used by merchants, and is not an independent source of law.67 This is
even echoed in the landmark case of Lickbarrow v Mason (1787), where Ashhurst J. stated that
while the custom of merchants establishes indorsability— namely, the transferability of a BOL by
indorsement—“the effect of that indorsement is a question of law.” 68 However, since this was an
action in trover, Grose J. limited the inquiry to “a mere question of law,” specifically, “whether,
as between the vendor and the assignee of the vendee, the bill of lading transfers the property.” 69

62

See fn.5. For this analysis I am particularly obliged to Aharon Barak, “The Nature of the Negotiable Instrument”

(1983) 18 Israel L. Rev. 49.
63

See text following fn.59. For the major differences, see text between fnn.31–41.

64

See fn.59.

65

See text following fn.59.

66

See e.g., Chat and Edgar Case (1663) 1 Keble 636; 83 E.R. 1156.

67

See fn.5 at pp.50–52. For further detail, see J.S. Rogers, The Early History of the Law of Bills and Notes: A Study

of the Origins of Anglo-American Commercial Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp.137–150.
68

See fn.42 at 2 T.R. 63 at 71; 100 E.R. 35 at 39.

69

See fn.42 at 2 T.R. 63 at 76; 100 E.R. 35 at 42.
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The holder’s cause of action on the BOL was not beyond the court’s power to recognise and yet it
did not address the point as its determination was not necessary for the resolution of the case.

If the holder’s lack of a cause of action on the BOL has truly been a matter of global
mercantile understanding reflected in the “custom of merchants" or ‘law merchant’, one would
have expected a similar rule elsewhere. However, in both France and Germany—two major
Continental jurisdictions—as under the common law, the transfer of the bill of lading is tantamount
to the transfer of the possession of the goods it covers.70 Yet, in both countries, the holder has a
standing to enforce the carrier’s obligation on the BOL.71

70

For the position in France see e.g., Rodière, Traité Général de Droit Maritime, Affrètements & Transports (1968),

stating at p.108 that “livrer le connaissement, c’est livrer la chose” (i.e., “delivery of the bill of lading is the delivery
of the thing [goods]”). See also K. Adyel, “L’importance des Fonctions du Connaissement Dans Les Operations de
Commerce International Par Mer” (Village de la Justice, 2010), Village de la Justice, https://www.villagejustice.com/articles/importance-fonctions-connaissement,12616.html [Accessed March 17, 2022]. Reflecting this
principle in Germany is § 524 in Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB), which is Germany’s Commercial Code. For an English
translation, visit https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_hgb/englisch_hgb.pdf [Accessed March 17, 2022].
71

In Germany, see HGB at fn.70, §§ 519–521. In France, “a bill of lading is not a document of title (titre de

propriété), because the rights which are transferred with it are of credit (titre de créance) but not of ownership.”
Stated otherwise, “[u]nder French law, a bill of lading gives its holder the right to claim delivery of the cargo
described in such a document just as a bill of exchange gives its holder the right to demand a sum of money.” See
Arria, “Legal Obstacles to the Implementation of the Electronic Bill of Lading in Civil Law Countries” (1997)
European Transport Law 709, 710, in the footsteps of Remond-Gouilloud, Droit Maritime (1993), p.356. See also
Rodière, Traité Général de Droit Maritime, Affrètements & Transports (1968), p.109 as well as Railas, The Rise of
the Lex Electronica and the International Sale of Goods: Facilitating Electronic Transactions Involving
Documentary Credit Operations (2004), pp.242–44 emphasising the difference and linking full negotiability to the
‘credit document’ character of the bill of lading. But cf. Adyel, “L’importance des Fonctions du Connaissement
Dans Les Operations de Commerce International Par Mer” (2010), arguing that under French law the BOL has the
same features as a document of title under English law.
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In England, Parliament swiftly reversed the absurd result of Thompson v Dominy (1845)72
and allowed a direct action by the holder-BFPV to enforce the carrier’s obligation on the BOL.73
This was an unusual exercise of legislative power not to codify a “custom of merchants,” 74 but
rather to fix a mistakenly created gap in it. In the final analysis, the logic of Lickbarrow v Mason
(1787)75 in resorting to negotiability should have led to a conclusion under which the negotiation
of the BOL confers on the holder not only the right to possess the goods, but also the right to
enforce the carrier’s obligations on it. However, having chosen the legislative route, Parliament
may have blocked courts from according on their own full negotiability to other, including newly
emerging, transport documents.

National legislation elsewhere frequently addresses the BOL as part of a broader category
of documents of title. Such is the case in the United States, where UCC § 1-201(b)(16) lists also
other documents, including the warehouse receipt. In fact, “any … document” that “purport[s] to
be issued by or addressed to a bailee and purport[s] to cover goods in the bailee's possession which
are either identified or are fungible portions of an identified mass,” is a document of title as long
as such document “in the regular course of business or financing is treated as adequately
evidencing that the person in possession of it is entitled to receive, hold, and dispose of the
document and the goods it covers.”

72

See fn.59.

73

First by the Bills of Lading Act 1855 (c.111), recently superseded by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992

(c.50). See e.g., Carol Proctor, The Legal Role of the Bill of Lading, Sea Waybill and Multimodal Transport
Document in Financing International Sale Contracts (Pretoria: University of South Africa, 1996), pp.67-70,
accessible online at: https://www.worldcat.org/title/legal-role-of-the-bill-of-lading-sea-waybill-and-multimodaltransport-document-in-financing-international-sales-contracts/oclc/122291880 [Accessed March 17, 2022]. For a
full analysis of the superseding legislation, see e.g., Robert Bradgate & Fidelma White, “The Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act 1992” (1993) 56 Mod. L. Rev. 188.
74

As e.g., the BEA.

75

See fn.42.
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Under UCC § 7-104(a):
“A document of title is negotiable if by its terms the goods are to be delivered76 to bearer
or to the order of a named person.”
Under UCC § 7-501(a), the negotiable document is transferable by delivery77 plus, where
it is made out or properly indorsed to a name person, by the indorsement78 of that person.79

The prevailing global understanding of the non-negotiable (‘straight’) BOL is that it may
be transferred only once, to the named consignee identified in the bill from its inception, who takes
it by delivery alone, without being indorsed, and who must produce it to obtain delivery of the
goods.80 Deviating from it, the UCC accommodates continuous transferability to different people

76

Under § 1-201(b)(15) of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) (United States), with respect to a document of

title, ‘Delivery’ is defined to mean “voluntary transfer of possession.”
77

For delivery without indorsement and the right to compel indorsement, see UCC § 7-506. Under UCC § 1-

201(b)(15), ‘delivery’ means “voluntary transfer of possession.”
78

Under UCC § 7-505, unlike in the case of negotiable instrument, an indorser of a document of title is not a

guarantor for other parties.
79

See also UCC § 7-501(d), under which:
“The naming in a negotiable bill of lading of a person to be notified of the arrival of the goods does not
limit the negotiability of the bill or constitute notice to a purchaser of the bill of any interest of that person
in the goods.”

As well, see UCC § 7-501 (c), providing that negotiation works only for a negotiable document of title.
80

See J.I. MacWilliam Co Inc v Mediterranean Shipping Co SA (The Rafaela S), [2003] EWCA Civ 556, [2004]

Q.B. 702, affirmed in [2005] UKHL 11; [2005] 2 A.C. 423, following the earlier decision of the Singapore Court of
Appeal in Peer Voss v APL Co Pte Ltd, [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 707.
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in succession other than by negotiation of both negotiable and non-negotiable documents of title,81
including BOLs.82 Under UCC § 7-504(a), such transfer requires the transfer of the document to
the transferee, which is an obvious requirement for a TDC, without which delivery of the goods
cannot be claimed from the carrier. Furthermore, under UCC § 7-504(b), in the case of a transfer
other than by negotiation, the transferee’s protection from claims of enumerated third parties83
requires the receipt by the carrier of notice of the transfer.
Similarly, under art.250(2) of the Maritime Code of Spain,84 nominative BOLs, namely
those which are issued neither to the bearer not to the order, are transferable “through assignment
according to the regulations governing the assignment of non-endorsable credits.”
As for rights acquired in the absence of a due negotiation85, under UCC § 7-504(a):

“A transferee of a document of title, whether negotiable or nonnegotiable, to which the
document has been delivered but not duly negotiated acquires the title and rights that its
transferor had or had actual authority to convey.” 86

81

UCC § 7-104.

82

“Document of title” is broadly defined in UCC § 1-201(b)(16) to include, among others, the bill of lading and the

warehouse receipt.
83

Such as transferor’s creditors, buyers and lessees from the transferor in the ordinary course of business and the

bailee dealing in good faith with the transferor.
84

Law 14/2014 of 24 July 2014 on Maritime Navigation (Spain).

85

Under UCC § 7- 501(5):
“A document is duly negotiated if it is negotiated … to a holder that purchases it in good faith, without
notice of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any person, and for value, unless it is established
that the negotiation is not in the regular course of business or financing or involves receiving the document
in settlement or payment of a monetary obligation.”
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Universally, and not only under UCC art.7, whether or not it is transferable other than to
the consignee, a non-negotiable BOL is not transferable by negotiation. Its transferability is thus
incapable of conferring on the transferee a better title than that of the transferor. Whether the
negotiation of a negotiable BOL is capable of conferring a superior title on the transferee is
discussed in Part IV.
The transferability by negotiation facilitates the use of the BOL as a trade finance tool.87
Thus, in a documentary sale, the parties may use the documentary collection method for payment.
The seller may draw a draft (bill of exchange) on the buyer for the price of the goods transported
to the buyer. The seller may send the draft together with the BOL (and other shipping documents)
through the seller’s bank to the buyer’s bank. Depending on whether the draft is a sight or time
draft, the buyer’s bank will surrender the BOL (and other shipping documents) to the buyer against
the buyer’s payment or acceptance. To bridge the gap between the delivery of the goods to the
carrier and receipt of payment for them, the seller may discount the draft with the seller’s bank.
The seller’s bank may rely on the BOL as collateral securing the seller’s reimbursement obligation
on the seller’s indorsement to that bank. Whether the seller’s indorsement to the seller’s bank is
with recourse or without recourse, the BOL in the hands of the draft holder will also secure the
buyer’s obligation on the acceptance of the draft.

At the other end of the sale transaction, whether or not the seller discounted the draft with
the seller’s bank, the BOL (together with the other shipping documents) will not be delivered to
the buyer until the buyer pays or accepts the draft. For its part, the buyer’s bank may advance funds
to the buyer in which case it will rely on the BOL and through it on the goods themselves as
collateral securing the buyer’s reimbursement obligation. Furthermore, the buyer’s bank will

86

In the case of a non-negotiable document of title, certain defences are cut off by notice to the bailee. See UCC § 7-

504(b).
87

For the recognition of the BOL as an instrument of credit, see Norman Miller, “Bills of Lading and Factors in

Nineteenth Century English Overseas Trade” (1957) 24 U Chicago L. Rev. 256 at 267–281.
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release the BOL to the buyer on trust terms. Under a ‘trust receipt’ accordingly issued, the buyer
is a trustee and its bank is the beneficiary, who remains in constructive possession of the BOL and
through it of the goods it represents, even after the buyer obtains the goods from the carrier against
the presentation of the BOL. Thereby the buyer’s bank purports to obtain a proprietary claim to
the proceeds realised from the subsequent sale of the goods by the buyer.88 Banks involved in trade
finance also prefer the BOL to be substantively negotiable, so as to confer on them a superior title.
This option, which is not universally fully available, is discussed in the following Part.
For decades this mode of finance has been in sharp decline in the West.89 At present,
TTDCs—whether or not they are documents of title such a BOLs—are used to prove the transfer
by negotiation of control of the goods. They are also frequently used in international trade as means
of evidence for the shipment of the goods, as well as to establish and meet documentary
requirements in payments under letters of credit. At the same time, the use of TTDCs purporting
to function as documents of title in trade finance is on the rise in the Chinese-based domestic and
foreign trade and elsewhere in East and South Asia.90

IV.

Title Accorded by Negotiation – The Extent of Negotiability

Substantive negotiability involves the power of a transferor of an instrument or document to accord
to a qualified transferee—generally speaking, a BFPV—a superior title, or more specifically, a

88

For an early-modern comprehensive discussion on the various ways in which a bill of lading can serve as a

collateral, see e.g., Frederick Thulin, “Bill of Lading as Collateral Security under Federal Laws” (1918) 16 Mich. L.
Rev. 402 at 403–404. See also Britton, “Negotiable Documents of Title” (1954) 5 Hasting L.J. 103, 106–112.
89

See e.g., Boris Kozolchyk, “Evolution and Present State of the Ocean Bill of Lading from a Banking Law

Perspective” (1992) 23 J. Mar. L. & Comm. 161, 161–162.
90

The concluding paragraphs of this Part (as of fn.87) heavily rely on information provided to the author by bankers

connected to the ICC (International Chamber of Commerce) from various counties. Emails are in the author’s hands.
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better title than that of the transferor, free of third parties’ adverse claims (namely, equities of
ownership) and prior parties’ defences (namely, equities of liability).91

I argue that one can distinguish among three degrees of substantive negotiability. To begin
with, where negotiability is limited, for the qualified transferee to gain a superior title, the
transferor must have been in lawful possession. Next, where negotiability is full, the transferor
ought to be a holder, even if in unlawful possession. Finally, where the negotiability is complete,
the transferor could be any possessor, not necessarily in lawful possession and not even a holder.
For his or her part, ‘holder’ is the bearer of an instrument or document made out to bearer (or
indorsed in blank) or the person in possession of an instrument or document made out or indorsed
to him or her.92

In this framework, as developed in the law of negotiable instruments, a person to whom
the instrument or document was either issued or indorsed, subject to separately agreed-upon
restrictions (e.g., for safekeeping only), is a holder in lawful possession. He or she may confer on
a qualified transferee who is unaware of the restrictions a superior title free of such restrictions.93
For his or her part, a thief of a bearer instrument or document is a holder—albeit in unlawful
possession—who can accord a superior title under full (but not limited) negotiability.94 At the same
time, under English law, a thief of an instrument either made out or indorsed to another person is
not even a holder.95 In the absence of complete negotiability under English law, this thief cannot
accord title to his or her transferee.

91

See text around fn.25.

92

cf. BEA s.2, defining (in relation to bills of exchange, cheques and promissory notes) ‘holder’ to mean “the payee

or indorsee of a bill or note who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof.”
93

See e.g., London Joint Stock Bank v Simmons [1892] A.C. 201 (H.L.).

94

See e.g., Miller v Race (1758) 1 Burr. 452; 97 E.R. 397.
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For negotiable payment instruments, common law settled on full negotiability. Complete
negotiability was specifically rejected.96 Legislation in both the UK97 and the USA98 has adopted
this position, even if subject to specific exceptions, which substantially vary between these two
countries.99 Conversely, the civil law position, reflected in international conventions governing
negotiable payment instruments, recognises complete negotiability. Thereunder, and contrary to
the position in the UK and the USA, one who takes under a forged indorsement may become a
“lawful holder” so as obtain title to the stolen negotiable payment instrument.100

An overwhelming majority of—if not all—jurisdictions recognise some measure of
substantive negotiability, namely, the good title of the transferee-holder to whom the BOL was
negotiated by a previous lawful holder with the intent of passing title.101 It is, however, often

95

Other than the payee, a holder must take the instrument by ‘negotiation’ which, in the case of an instrument

payable to order, requires the indorsement of the previous holder. See BEA s.31.
96

Mead v Young (1790) 4 T.R. 28; 100 E.R. 876.

97

BEA s.24.

98

UCC § 3-403.

99

For an extensive discussion, see Benjamin Geva, Bank Collections and Payment Transactions: Comparative

Study of Legal Aspects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp.465–487, 501–514.
100

Convention Providing a Uniform Law for Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes (Geneva, 1930) 143 L.N.T.S.

257, Annex I, art.16; Convention Providing a Uniform Law for Cheques (Geneva, 1931) 143 L.N.T.S. 355, Annex I,
arts 19, 21.
101

I read this between the lines of Railas, The Rise of the Lex Electronica and the International Sale of Goods:

Facilitating Electronic Transactions Involving Documentary Credit Operations (2004), p.243.
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stated102 that the negotiability of the BOL under English law goes merely to the form of transfer,
rather than to confer on the transferee-holder acquiring the BOL in good faith and for value a better
title than that of the transferring holder.103 This is certainly true inasmuch as “documents of title
to goods never have the currency of money.”104 However, this position overlooks limited
negotiability; that is, the ability of a good faith purchaser for value to acquire under some
circumstances, as a matter of law, a better title than that of the transferor.

To begin with, even in the less usual case in which the contract for carriage contains terms
not included in the BOL,105 as against a holder-BFPV, the carrier may not raise defences not
stemming from terms included in the BOL.106 This is unlike an obligor under an assigned debt
who may raise against an assignee all defences available to the obligor under the contract giving
rise to the debt.107

As for protection from adverse claims, Lord Campbell C.J. stated in Gurney v Behrend
(1854)108 that:

102

See e.g., Proctor, The Legal Role of the Bill of Lading, Sea Waybill and Multimodal Transport Document in

Financing International Sale Contracts (1996), p.71 and McKendrick, Goode and McKendrick on Commercial Law
(2020), p.994 and the sources each cites.
103

For these two components of negotiability (albeit focusing on debt instruments, i.e., bills of exchange, cheques,

and promissory notes) see the text around fn.5.
104

M.G. Bridge, The Sale of Goods, 4th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), para.5.47.

105

For the usual case to the contrary, see the text around fnn.37–39.
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See e.g., George Kallis (Manufacturers) Ltd v Success Insurance Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 8 at 11;

Partenreederei M/S “Heidberg” v Grosvenor Grain & Feed Co Ltd (the Heidberg) [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 287, 310.
See generally: Treitel & Reynolds, Carver on Bills of Lading (2017), pp.102–105.
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See e.g., The Government of Newfoundland v The Newfoundland Railway Company (1888) 13 App. Cas. 199 (PC).
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Gurney v Behrend (1854) 3 Ellis & Blackburn’s Q.B. Rep. 624; 118 E.R. 1275.
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“Ever since the great case of Lickbarrow v Mason109 … the law has been considered to be
that the bona fide transferee, for value, of a bill of lading, indorsed by the shipper or his
consignee, and put into circulation by the authority of the shipper or consignee, has an
absolute title to the goods, freed from the equitable right of the unpaid vendor to stop in
transitu, as against the purchaser.” 110

However, Gurney v Behrend did not go as far as to understand Lickbarrow v Mason as endowing
the BOL with the full features of negotiability. Rather it held that: 111

“A bill of lading is not, like a bill of exchange or promissory note, a negotiable instrument,
which passes by mere delivery to a bona fide transferee for valuable consideration,112
without regard to the title of the parties who make the transfer. Although the shipper may
have indorsed in blank a bill of lading deliverable to his assigns, his right is not affected
by an appropriation of it without his authority. If it be stolen from him, or transferred
without his authority,113 a subsequent bona fide transferee for value cannot make title under
it, as against the shipper of the goods.”

109

Lickbarrow v Mason (1787) 2 T.R. 63; 100 E.R. 35.

110

Gurney v Behrend (1854) 3 Ellis & Blackburn’s Q.B. Rep. 624 at 638–639; 118 E.R. 1275 at 1280–1281.

111

Gurney v Behrend (1854) 3 Ellis & Blackburn’s Q.B. Rep. 624 at 633–634; 118 E.R. 1275 at 1279.

112

Certainly, in the absence of an indorsement signature, this must be taken to apply only to bills of exchange or

promissory notes either payable to bearer or indorsed in blank.
113

However, as discussed below, ‘authority’ is inherently apparent for a transferor in lawful possession.
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Opponents of the substantive negotiability of the BOL seize on the requirement that the
BOL be “put into circulation by the authority of the shipper or consignee.”114 Thus, they explain
Gurney v Behrend on grounds other than negotiability. For example, McKendrick suggests the
transferee’s better title on the basis “of some exception to the nemo dat rule, e.g., estoppel” rather
than something inherent in the nature of the negotiable documents of title.115

However, in Gurney v Behrend, the Court was specifically concerned only with whether
the BOL came “into the possession of the [holder] … with the authority of the [shipper].”116
Effectively, I argue, the key for deciding in favour of the holder was the holder’s mere lawful
possession of the BOL, received from an intermediary, to whom the shipper had delivered the bill,
with the apparent authority to transfer. Notwithstanding McKendrick, apparent authority is
arguably inherent in lawfully possessing a negotiable BOL by an eligible internal,117 as long as the
BOL is silent as to any restriction on the holder’s power to negotiate it, and is not fact-driven so
as to be considered in each case on its own. 118 As such it reflects limited negotiability. Moreover,
in the facts of Gurney v Behrend, there is no convincing basis for making a distinction between
the first and second delivery; the lawful possession of a BOL suffices to covey apparent authority
and hence the power to convey a superior title. Finally, even if historically transferability by
negotiation has not produced automatically substantive negotiation,
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it is obvious that the

114

See text around fn.110.
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McKendrick, Goode and McKendrick on Commercial Law (2020), p.994 fn.73.
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Gurney v Behrend (1854) 3 Ellis & Blackburn’s Q.B. Rep. 624 at 634; 118 E.R. 1275 at 1280.
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Which is not necessarily the case for merely having the authority to deliver orders to a warehouse: Farquharson

Brothers v King [1902] A.C. 325.
118

When the actual possessor is not a person reasonably expected to act on behalf of the transferor, the taker from

him or her may be taken not to act in good faith so as not to gain protection as a BFPV.
119

The bumpy road from transferability by negotiation to material negotiability is addressed in Geva, The Payment

Order of Antiquity (2011), pp. 582–584.
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protection given to the BFPV in Lickbarrow v Mason120 was perceived as the result of the
negotiation. This is not to mention the “absolute title … freed from [an] equitable right” of the
holder of the BOL taken by negotiation in Lickbarrow v Mason. This is linguistically a reminiscent
of the freedom from "equities of the bill", "equities that attach to the bill itself', "equities affecting
it", or equities "with which the bill is incumbered" of a holder who takes by negotiation a
negotiable bill of exchange or promissory note.121

Under limited negotiability, not having authorised the transfer to a thief, a dispossessed exholder of a BOL may recover not only from the thief but also from a subsequent holder who took
the document by negotiation from a thief (or someone deriving title from the thief) in good faith
and for value. While logically such state of law is not inevitable, limited negotiability can be
understood once it is recalled that in English law, full negotiability emerged as an explanation to
the currency quality of the banknote as a monetary object. Whether the expansion of full
negotiability to other payment instruments was mindless or thoughtful is beside the point. Suffice
it to say that the application of full negotiability also to BOLs would have been a step removed
and thus not inevitable.

It is noteworthy that for a transport document to be endowed with limited negotiability it
must be transferable by negotiation. As explained in Part II, a railway consignment note or receipt
is a TDC only in a limited sense. Its lawful holding does not indicate apparent authority. Hence, it
was correctly held that, on its own, the transfer of such a document cannot convey a superior title
to a BFPV.122
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Lickbarrow v Mason (1787) 2 T.R. 63; 100 E.R. 35.

121

For a summary, discussion and these interchangeable expressions see: In Re Overend, Gurney, & Co (1868) L.R.

6 Eq. 344 at 359–361; Note, “Equities Attaching to Overdue Bills of Exchange” (1870) 49 L.T. 122.
122

Mercantile Bank of India Ltd v Central Bank of India Ltd [1938] A.C. 287 (not following Commonwealth Trust

Ltd v Akotey [1926] A.C. 72 (P.C.)).
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Limited negotiability is not confined to BOLs. Rather, it facilitates a fresh view on the
common law treatment of the purchaser in possession of a certificate of a registered share, who
took it, for value and in good faith, bearing a blank indorsement by the registered shareholder.
Thus, in Colonial Bank v Cady (1890),123 the BFPV in possession of a registered share certificate
indorsed in blank, who derived title from the original registered shareholder, was protected from
adverse claims. Such an adverse claim could not successfully be asserted by an earlier buyer from
the owner who had not taken possession of the certificate. Alternatively, an adverse claim could
not successfully be asserted by the owner where the buyer (to be protected) purchased the share
certificate from the owner’s agent who had lawful possession but had sold the share certificate in
breach of authority.124 Conversely, when the BFPV in possession of a share certificate indorsed in
blank derived title from a thief, the purchaser would not have been protected against the
dispossessed earlier holder (including the original registered owner).

True, protection accorded to the BFPV of a ‘documentary intangible,’ in this context either
a BOL or share certificate indorsed in blank, as well as a BOL made out to bearer, is limited to
one who takes it from a lawful possessor. As such it is in line with the protection given under the
apparent authority principle. It is also in line with protection given to a BFPV of goods from a
non-owner in lawful possession, as provided by the statutory rules applicable to the sale of goods.
However, protection accorded by limited negotiability is not precluded by protection accorded by
statutory rules under sales law125 and apparent authority. Nor is it of identical scope. Usually, even
if not always, it is broader.

123

Colonial Bank v Cady (1890) 15 A.C. 267 (H.L.), dealing with acquisition from brokers to whom executors of a

deceased shareholder surrendered share certificates indorsed in blank.
124

As in Fuller v Glyn, Mills, Currie & Co [1914] 2 K.B. 168 (K.B.D.), specifically applying Colonial Bank v Cady

(1890) 15 A.C. 267 (H.L.).
125

Namely, protection accorded by limited negotiability falls into the category of “rules of the common law” that are

not “inconsistent with the provisions of this Act” so as to “apply contracts for the sale of goods” under SGA s.62(2).
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First, only a BFPV by negotiation of a ‘documentary intangible’ qualifies. Second, on the
other hand, compared to the beneficiary under sale of goods and apparent authority rules, the
BFPV-holder of a ‘documentary intangible’ is protected under broader circumstances. Indeed,
statutory provisions protect both beneficiaries126 when buying from

a seller remaining in

possession of goods,127 a would be buyer taking possession of goods,128 as well as from an agent
exceeding authority to dispose of the goods.129 Both are also protected upon buying from
somebody with a voidable title that has not yet been voided.130 However, only the BFPV of a
‘documentary intangible’ and not the beneficiary under the sale of goods and apparent authority
rules is also protected upon taking by negotiation from any lawful holder—even, for example,
when the adverse claimant neither intended to pass property,131 nor presented the transferor as
authorised to carry out the transfer.
Third, the qualified holder of the negotiable document of title need not necessarily be a
buyer, as under SGA rules, but could also be a secured party.132 Fourth, negotiability is the best, if
not the only, explanation to the confinement of the carrier’s obligation to the holder-BFPV strictly
to the terms contained in the BOL to the exclusion of anything else that might have been agreed
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McKendrick, Goode and McKendrick on Commercial Law (2020), pp.325–326. Under these provisions, goods

must be delivered and documents of title transferred: McKendrick, p.511.
127

SGA s.25(1); Factors Act 1889 (c.45) s.8.
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SGA s.25(2); Factors Act 1889 (c.45) s.9.
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Factors Act 1889 (c.45) s.2(1).
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SGA s.23, albeit covering the document of title holder only implicitly.
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See text around fn.119.
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Which is also the case in connection with agent with authority to dispose of the goods. Factors Act 1889 s.2(1) as

distinguished from SGA ss.25(1) and (2).

32

between the carrier and the consignor.133 Fifth, for its part, the expansion of negotiability to bills
of exchange and promissory notes beyond the ‘currency’ reasoning, particularly as applied to
banknotes, or more generally to negotiable instruments payable to bearer, was not an independent
process. Rather, it coincided and was intertwined with the evolving law providing protection for a
BFPV of goods in the circumstances set out above.134 Since the objective was enhancing the flow
of commerce,135 I am inclined to speculate that skipping documents of title was accidental.

There are two principal advantages for viewing the BFPV of a negotiable BOL as protected
under negotiability, albeit limited. First, it opens the door to considering whether negotiability
should not be extended, at least to full negotiability. Second, it brings the BFPV’s protection to be
governed in England by the same doctrine as in all other egal systems, which facilitates
harmonization—if not a search for uniformity—an important theme in international trade.

In the final analysis, maintaining the status quo of protection limited to sales law and
apparent authority, opting for limited negotiability, or adopting full (or even complete)
negotiability is a matter for a policy decision. Under the status quo, a document of title is no more
than a representative of goods. Accordingly, dealing with it ought not to produce results different
from those emerging with dealing with the goods. On the other hand, using documents of title in
trade finance may enhance benefits if some degree of negotiability is accorded.

In any event, in some other legal systems, the effect of negotiation of negotiable BOLs is
not confined to limited negotiability as under the common law. Among civil law jurisdictions, the
position of the holder of a negotiable BOL acquiring it in good faith and without gross

133

See fn.106 and the text around it.

134

Geva, The Payment Order of Antiquity (2011), pp.554–567.

135

See fn.134.
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negligence136 from (or through) a thief, varies.137 For example, the Maritime Codes of Norway138
and Spain139 protect such a purchaser so as to confer upon the BOL complete negotiability. Many
if not most statutes elsewhere are silent on this point.

In the United States, the key to the acquisition of a superior title is ‘due negotiation’ of a
negotiable document of title. Under UCC § 7-501(a)(5):

“A document is duly negotiated if it is negotiated in the manner stated in this subsection to
a holder140 that purchases it in good faith, without notice of any defense against or claim to

136

Being the general civilian formula for the acquisition of the status corresponding to that of a holder in due course

of a negotiable monetary debt instrument under Anglo-American law. See e.g., art.16(2) of the Convention
Providing a Uniform Law for Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes (Geneva, 1930) 143 L.N.T.S. 257, Annex I,
accessible at: https://www.jus.uio.no/lm/bills.of.exchange.and.promissory.notes.convention.1930/doc.html#54
[Accessed March 17, 2022].
137

See Railas, The Rise of the Lex Electronica and the International Sale of Goods: Facilitating Electronic

Transactions Involving Documentary Credit Operations (2004), p.243.
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The Norwegian Maritime Code 1994 (Norway) s.306, accessible at

https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_isn=88374&p_lang=en [Accessed March 17, 2022]. Under
s.306(2): “A person who in good faith has acquired an order or bearer bill of lading is not obliged to surrender it to
the person who lost it.”
139

Law 14/2014 of 24 July 2014 on Maritime Navigation (Spain), accessible at

https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-2014-7877 [Accessed March 17, 2022], providing at art.254 that:
“When a person is dispossessed for any reason of a bill of lading, whether it is a bill of lading, or an
endorsable bill of lading, the new holder who would have acquired it inter vivos according to the document
circulation law will not be obliged to return it if you acquired it in good faith and without serious fault. The
rights and actions of the legitimate owner against those responsible for acts of illegitimate dispossession
will be safe.”
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Under the relevant part of UCC § 1-201(b)(21), ‘holder’ of a tangible document of title is defined to mean:
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it on the part of any person, and for value, unless it is established that the negotiation is not
in the regular course of business or financing or involves receiving the document in
settlement or payment of a monetary obligation.”

In turn, under UCC § 7-501(a)(1), a document made out to order “is negotiated by the named
person's indorsement and delivery.” In the footsteps of the common law, negotiation and hence
due negotiation of a document made out to order, must thus be made through the indorsement of
a holder, not necessarily in lawful possession, and yet a holder. As in connection with negotiable
instruments, the civilian complete negotiability is thus rejected. Unlike the common law governing
bills of lading, negotiability is thus full and not limited.

Under UCC § 7-502(a), a holder to which a negotiable document of title has been duly
negotiated acquires thereby:

“(1) title to the document;

(2) title to the goods;

(3) all rights accruing under the law of agency or estoppel, including rights to goods
delivered to the bailee after the document was issued; and

(4) the direct obligation of the issuer to hold or deliver the goods according to the terms of
the document free of any defense or claim by the issuer except those arising under the terms
of the document or under this article. … ”. (Emphasis added.)

Under UCC § 7-502(b):

“… (B) the person in possession of a negotiable tangible document of title if the goods are deliverable
either to bearer or to the order of the person in possession.”
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“ … title and rights acquired by due negotiation are not defeated by any stoppage of the
goods represented by the document of title or by surrender of the goods by the bailee and
are not impaired even if:

(1) the due negotiation or any prior due negotiation constituted a breach of duty;

(2) any person has been deprived of possession of a negotiable tangible document
…

by misrepresentation, fraud, accident, mistake, duress, loss, theft, or

conversion; or

(3) a previous sale or other transfer of the goods or document has been made to a
third person.”

(Emphasis added.)

Both freedom from the issuer’s defences, and from third party claims, are thus available to the
acquirer by due negotiation.

Rights acquired by due negotiation are stated in UCC § 7-502(a) and (b) to be subject to
UCC § 7-503, addressing rights preceded the issuance of the document. The principle is that:

“ … the title of a purchaser by due negotiation prevails over almost any interest in the
goods which existed prior to the procurement of the document of title if the possession of
the goods by the person obtaining the document derived from any action by the prior
claimant which introduced the goods into the stream of commerce or carried them along
that stream.” 141

141

Official Comment to UCC § 7-503. Emphasis added.
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For example, unless estoppel is involved, a purchaser by due negotiation will not defeat an owner
from whom the shipper (or predecessor in title) stole the goods.142

V.

TTDCs under International Conventions and Other Instruments

International conventions governing the carriage of good by a unimodal means of
transportation hardly address transferability, let alone negotiability. Thus, the consignment
note under the United Nations Convention on International Carriage of Goods by Road
(CMR), 143 the COTIF/CIM Uniform Rules concerning the Contract of International Carriage
of Goods by Rail (“CIM Rules”) 144 and the SMGS Convention, 145 as well as the CIM/SMGS
Consignment Note Manual, 146 are TDCs in a limited way. 147 The same is true of the air

142

See fn.141.

143

Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR) (Geneva, 1956) 399

U.N.T.S. 189 (entered into force 2 July 1961). Available online from the University of Oslo Faculty of Law website:
https://www.jus.uio.no/lm/un.cmr.road.carriage.contract.convention.1956/doc.html [Accessed March 17, 2022].
144

Various relevant documents are indexed and accessible at:
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Various relevant documents are accessible online at: https://www.cit-rail.org/en/rail-transport-law/smps-smgs/

[Accessed March 17, 2022].
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[Accessed March 17, 2022].
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waybill under the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air (Montreal Convention). 148 All are not transferable by negotiation and thus are not
negotiable.149
The Hague-Visby Rules150 governing the carriage of goods by sea define in art.1(b)
“Contract of carriage” as applying “only to contracts of carriage covered by a [BOL] or any similar
document of title” which “regulates the relations between a carrier and a holder … ”. By reference
to the nature of the marine BOL151 and a few provisions alluding to it,152 negotiability is assumed
to exist and yet is not expressly addressed.

147

For the consignment note, see e.g., S. Baytan, “Turkey: The Content and Functions of The Consignment

Note Under The CMR” (Mondaq, 2012), Mondaq, https://www.mondaq.com/turkey/rail-roadcycling/170492/the-content-and-functions-of-the-consignment-note-under-the-cmr [Accessed March 17,
2022]. See also the SMGS Agreement art.26(1), under which upon the arrival of the goods to the destination
both the consignment note and the goods are to be given by the carrier to the consignee.
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Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (Montreal Convention)

(Montreal, 28 May 1999) 2242 U.N.T.S. 309 (entered into force 4 November 2003). Available online at:
https://www.jus.uio.no/lm/air.carriage.unification.convention.montreal.1999/ [Accessed March 17, 2022].
149

For the limited nature of them as TDCs, see the text following fn.10.
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Brussels on 25 August 1924, as amended by the Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification
of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading signed at Brussels on 23 February 1968 (Hague-Visby Rules)
1412 U.N.T.S. (entered into force 23 June 1977). Available online:
https://www.jus.uio.no/lm/sea.carriage.hague.visby.rules.1968/doc.html [Accessed March 17, 2022].
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For the BOL as the classic document of title to goods under the common law, see the text around fn.27.
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See e.g., art.III(4) (description of goods on a bill of lading is binding towards a third-party transferee acting in

good faith) and art.VI (bill of lading contrasted with “a receipt which shall be a non-negotiable document and shall
be marked as such”).

38

The 2000 Budapest Convention on the Contract for the Carriage of Goods by Inland
Waterway (CMNI)153 is an exception. In art.1(6), it defines “Transport document” to mean “a
document which evidences a contract of carriage and the taking over or loading of goods by a
carrier, made out in the form of a [BOL] or consignment note or of any other document used in
trade.” CMNI art.13 characterises the BOL as a document of title that may be “issued in the name
of the consignee, to order or to bearer,” and which must be presented in order to obtain the goods.
It is transferable “to a third party, including the consignee” who, upon taking it “in good faith in
reliance on the description of the goods therein,” benefits form an irrebuttable presumption as to
the accuracy of information included in the document. There is no definition for a “consignment
note or of any other document used in trade.”

Unlike international conventions governing the carriage of goods by a unimodal
means of transportation, conventions and other international instruments governing
multimodal means of carriage of goods address negotiability extensively and yet
incompletely. Three principal examples will be addressed. 154

153

Adopted by the Diplomatic Conference Organized Jointly by the Central Commission for the Navigation of the

Rhine (CCNR), the Danube Commission and UNECE, held in Budapest from 25 September to 3 October 2000
(entered into force 1 April 2005). Accessible online at: https://www.ccr-zkr.org/files/conventions/cmni_en.pdf
[Accessed March 17, 2022].
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See also e.g., the negotiable FIATA Multimodal Transport Bill of Lading (FBL), issued (alongside the FWB:

non-negotiable FIATA Multimodal Transport Waybill) and used by members of FIATA—translated from French to
English, the International Federation of Freight Forwarders Associations—a NGO representing freight forwarders
worldwide. See generally: M. Ardelt, “What is a FIATA Bill of Lading?” (Forto, 14 December 2017), Forto Blog,
https://forto.com/en/blog/fiata-bill-of-lading/ [Accessed March 17, 2022].
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First, the 1980 UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development)
Multimodal Convention 155 defines "Multimodal transport156 document" in art.1 as “a
document which evidences a multimodal transport contract, the taking in charge of the goods
by the multimodal transport operator, and an undertaking by him to deliver the goods in
accordance with the terms of that contract.” Under art.5(1), upon taking the goods, the MTO
“shall issue a multimodal transport document which, at the option of the consignor, shall be
in either negotiable or non-negotiable form.” Articles 6 and 7 address the form and
transferability of negotiable and non-negotiable transport documents. Under art 6(2), goods
are to be released by the MTO only “against surrender of the negotiable multimodal
transport document duly endorsed where necessary.” Under art.7(2), having issued a nonnegotiable multimodal transport document, the MTO “shall be discharged from his
obligation to deliver the goods if he makes delivery thereof to the consignee named in such
non-negotiable multimodal transport document or to such other person as he may be duly
instructed, as a rule, in writing.” This means that, during transit, the consignor remains in
control of the goods so that a non-negotiable multimodal transport document is not even a
TDC. Under art.10(b), the contents of a “multimodal transport document … issued in
negotiable form and … transferred to a third party, including a consignee, who has acted in
good faith in reliance on the description of the goods therein” is conclusive against the MTO.
Second, the 1992 UNCTAD/ICC Rules for Multimodal Transport Documents 157
apply under Rule 1 only upon their incorporation by the parties into their contract of
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United Nations Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods (Geneva, 24 May 1980), U.N. Doc.

TD/MT/CONF/16 (not in force), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XI-E1&chapter=11&clang=_en [Accessed March 17, 2022].
156

Requiring under art.1(1) “the carriage of goods by at least two different modes of transport,” excluding “[t]he

operations of pick-up and delivery of goods carried out in the performance of a unimodal transport contract.”
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TRADE/WP.4/INF.117/Corr.l, TD/B/FAL/INF.117/Corr.l. Accessible at: https://unctad.org/system/files/official-

document/tradewp4inf.117_corr.1_en.pdf [Accessed March 17, 2022]. For a discussion, see McKendrick, Goode
and McKendrick on Commercial Law (2020), p.1212.
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carriage, albeit “irrespective of whether there is a unimodal or a multimodal transport
contract involving one or several modes of transport.” Under art.2.6, a multimodal transport
document (MT document) may be issued either in a negotiable or non-negotiable format, as
further elaborated in art.4.3.

Third, the 2008 Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly
or Partly by Sea, known as the Rotterdam Rules (RR),158 “is ambitious in scope, covering not only
carriage of goods by sea but also, within limits, other modes of transport where used in conjunction
with carriage by sea.”

159

Having defined “Negotiable transport document” in RR art.1(15),

art.57(1) goes on to mandate transferability by negotiation—that is, by delivery—plus an
indorsement signature where delivery is to be made out to the order of a specified person.

In principle, the delivery of the goods may be claimed from the carrier by the holder and
made against the surrender of the document to the holder of a negotiable document.160 In other
cases, the entitlement is that of the consignee. 161 When a non-negotiable transport document that
indicates that it shall be surrendered in order to obtain delivery of the goods has been issued, the
surrender of the document by the consignee is required.162 This suggests the possibility of a nonnegotiable transport document that does not require surrender upon the delivery of the goods. Such

158

United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea (New

York, 2008) (Rotterdam Rules), CITRALOR, 63rd Sess, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/122,
https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/transportgoods/conventions/rotterdam_rules [Accessed March 17, 2022].
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McKendrick, Goode and McKendrick on Commercial Law (2020), p.1213.

160

RR, art.47, which nevertheless envisages a situation in which “the negotiable transport document or

the negotiable electronic transport record expressly states that the goods may be delivered without the surrender of
the transport document”.
161

RR art.45. See also art.1(11): “‘Consignee’ means a person entitled to delivery of the goods under a contract of

carriage or a transport document or electronic transport record.”
162

RR art.46. See also arts 51(2), 54(2).
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a transport document is obviously not a TDC.163 Query as to the implications, if any, under the
Rotterdam Rules of any statement on a non-negotiable transport document according to which it
is transferable other than by negotiation. Under RR art.1(10), “holding” is linked to the possession
of a negotiable document.

In principle, under RR art.41(b), a transport document is prima facie evidence of the
carrier’s receipt of the goods as stated in the contract particulars. Proof to the contrary by the carrier
in respect of any contract particulars shall not be admissible, when such contract particulars are
included in:

“(i) A negotiable transport document … that is transferred to a third party acting in good
faith; or

(ii) A non-negotiable transport document that indicates that it must be surrendered in order
to obtain delivery of the goods and is transferred to the consignee acting in good faith;”

As well, under RR art.41(c),

“Proof to the contrary by the carrier shall not be admissible against a consignee that in good
faith has acted in reliance on any of [specified] contract particulars included in a nonnegotiable transport document” 164
Effectively, it is only the transferee of a negotiable document that has an unqualified right
to rely on the information contained in the document. Typically, such a transferee is a holder to
whom the document or record was transferred.
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This is reinforced by art.4.3(d) of the UNCTAD/ICC Rules for Multimodal Transport Documents, providing that:
“[W]hen the MT document has been issued in a non-negotiable form, [delivery to the goods] to the person
named as consignee in the document [is to be made] upon proof of his identity” (emphasis in original).

164

Such particular are primarily by reference to RR art.36, addressing information provided by the shipper and

carrier.
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As well, RR art.25(1)(c), provides that goods may be carried on the deck of a ship only
under specified circumstances. One such case is where “[t]he carriage on deck is in accordance
with the contract of carriage, or the customs, usages or practices of the trade in question.” However,
under RR art.25(4), the carrier may not invoke this provision “against a third party that has
acquired a negotiable transport document … in good faith, unless the contract particulars state that
the goods may be carried on deck.”

***

By way of summary, international conventions addressing unimodal means of
transportation are quite sparse in addressing the negotiability or even transferability of TDCs.
Other than in maritime and river trade, transport documents thereunder are not even TDCs. For
their part, overall, conventions addressing multimodal transportation accord negotiability to
TTDCs governed by them if so desired by the parties. They also provide the holder with the right
to claim the delivery of the goods from the carrier. Nonetheless, they do not specify the type,
contents or extent of negotiability. They also do not address the nature of such TTDCs as
documents of title.

As pointed out at the conclusion of Part III, to have the maximum potential for use in trade
finance, a transport document ought to be not only negotiable to one degree or another. Rather, it
also ought to have the capacity to be a document of title capable of conferring on its holder a
personal claim against the carrier, constructive possession, and property in the goods. What is thus
needed to complete the extensive and helpful work of UNCITRAL is a versatile modal-neutral
transport document whose nature, between a mere receipt and document of title, may be adapted
by the parties as they wish in each given case. As UNCITRAL work demonstrates, a demand for
the use of a transport document with such features in international trade—which may not exist in
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the West—certainly exists in Chinese-based domestic and foreign trade and elsewhere in South
and East Asia.165

VI.

Conclusion

In recent years, with the emergence of a long-distance land-based trade, particularly by rail in
Eurasia, along with the expansion of a non-sea based multimodal trade, a demand arose for a TTDC
which is not limited to marine transport. A series of international conventions partly responded to
such demand by providing for new types of negotiable transport documents. However, these
conventions failed to clarify the full meaning of negotiability thereunder. As well, they failed to
explicitly accord to such documents the features of a document of title. This undermines their use
in trade finance.

The task of overcoming this obstacle is hindered by the fragmentary nature of the law
governing TTDCs. Thus, while negotiability of the marine BOL is generally recognised, its content
is neither uniform nor always clear, even at the common law. As well, the nature of the ‘straight’
BOL is not uniform. For transport documents other than the marine BOL, even negotiability, and
sometimes their nature as control documents, is either lacking or uncertain. Moreover, for all
transport documents, even the marine BOL in some civil law jurisdictions, there may be a question
as to their nature as tokens for a property right in the goods.

With land-based trade over rail being extended from China to the UK, courts in the UK
may encounter documents of control other than the marine BOL purporting to be negotiable and
operate as documents of title; that is, capable of passing the right to enforce the carrier delivery
obligation, as well as constructive possession with or without property. Furthermore, substantive
uniform laws ought to be established to accommodate international trade throughout the world.
The clarification of principles towards the emergence of a versatile modal-neutral transport
document, fully adaptable to the needs of contracting parties and governed by clear principles of
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Principal documents are cited in fn.2.
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law in both international and domestic spheres, has been undertaken in this article. It is necessary
first step towards harmonization, not to speak of the crafting of uniform laws, which at a later stage
could be extended to cover electronic TTDCs.
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